History of the World/History of the World (Bureau Development, Inc.)(1992).BIN/dp/0120/01209.txt

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$Title{England In Egypt}
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Title:       England In Egypt
Author:      Bright, James Franck

England In Egypt

1881

     The dealings between England and Egypt in 1881-1885 present a singular
combination and conflict of ancient and modern forces.  On the one hand, the
primary difficulty arose from the conditions of world-wide finance peculiar to
modern times.  English forces were sent into Egypt to secure the payment of
loans by establishing such governmental conditions as would prevent idleness
on the part of the people and wastefulness on the part of the officials.  And
the construction of the Suez Canal had given the Powers of Western Europe a
new and most important interest in peace and wise government for Egypt.  On
the other hand, the English army was confronted by a formidable force
commanded by a pretended prophet, known as the Mahdi, and actuated by
deep-rooted superstition and religious frenzy.  The disasters that are so
common when an army in the field is dependent upon and controlled by a distant
civilian government, were not wanting here; and final victory was attained
only after the armies of Hicks Pacha and Baker Pacha had been destroyed by the
Mahdists and Khartum had fallen.  General Gordon, heroically holding that
important post at the great forks of the Nile, and looking anxiously for the
relief expedition which official blundering delayed until it was two days too
late, is one of the most pathetic figures in history.  He was especially dear
to Americans because the peculiar service that he rendered to China in
organizing her forces for the suppression of the Tai-ping Rebellion was
performed in cooperation with Frederick Townsend Ward, of Massachusetts
(1831-1862), who fell by a chance shot when the work was complete.

     The attitude of the Porte in the Egyptian difficulties that arose in 1881
was the natural result of its desire to assert its sovereignty in Egypt, its
extreme unwillingness to admit European interference, and its lukewarmness in
using its influence and arms to restore order.  No less natural was the wish
of Lord Granville and the English Cabinet to restore the self-respect of the
Turkish Government, and, by acknowledging and making use both of its influence
and arms in Egypt, to attempt to remove the soreness caused by the late
events.

     The Conservative Government had left its successor a difficult problem in
Egypt.  The great financial interests at stake had induced the European Powers
to interfere in the country, to restrain the wild misgovernment and
spendthrift extravagance of Ismail.  It had, however, been generally
acknowledged that France, as the great Mediterranean Power with an Egyptian
connection of long standing, and England, as the ruler of India, had more than
mere financial interests at stake in the well-being of Egypt.  An agreement
had been made by which a joint control exercised by France and England had
been established.  Ismail having been removed from the throne in June, 1879,
it was under this dual superintendence that his son Tewfik was called upon to
govern his dominions.  There was a strong feeling in England in favor of the
assumption of some more complete command in the country, either by direct
annexation or under some form of protectorate; but, on the other hand, there
was among a large section of the Liberals a dislike to any addition to the
responsibilities of the empire.  Between these two extremes of party feeling
the new ministers had to steer their way.  They accepted at first, in this, as
in other cases, the action of their predecessors.  But they refused to go a
step beyond it.  Their efforts were directed to honest cooperation with France
in carrying out a work intrusted to them by the European Powers.  This work
they regarded as the supervision of the Egyptian Government.  They would
listen to no suggestion of taking any part of that government upon themselves.
It is obvious that the line they adopted was in the last degree critical.
Differences of opinion might at any moment arise between themselves and their
French colleagues; the direction of a government by moral suasion, and without
the use of force, is likely either to be ineffective or by gradual steps to
lose its purely persuasive character.  It took nearly the whole of their
tenure of power, a period of checkered fortune and much disaster and much
mismanagement, to clear away these difficulties and enable England to carry
out its task of Egyptian regeneration.

     As has been said, Europe had interfered upon financial grounds.  Before
any reforms in administration or justice could be carried out, something like
equilibrium had to be established beween the revenue and the expenses.  The
first great step in this direction was made when the International Commission
of Liquidation was appointed in April, 1880, and when, on its report in July,
the Law of Liquidation was promulgated.  This law, which, although it has been
modified, is still the basis of the financial arrangements of Egypt, was
virtually a composition on the part of Egypt with its creditors on terms
dictated by the great Powers.  The essential principle of the arrangement was
the division of the revenue into two portions, one of which was to be paid to
the International Commission of the debt, or, as it was called, the "caisse de
la dette"; the other to be devoted to the expense of the administration. The
various debts were consolidated under four heads, and the interest payable on
them to the bondholders was limited to a sum which it was thought that Egypt
could afford to pay.  The amount to be spent on administration was also
limited to what was regarded as the proper expenditure of the country. Should
there be a surplus in the receipts of the caisse, the Government had no right
to share it; should there be a surplus in the administrative revenue, the
caisse had certain claims upon it.  This law was a long step forward, and
restored the financial solvency of the country.  At the same time, the limit
set to expenditure, and the claims of the caisse (an international body),
raised an obstacle in the way of large reforms, and placed the country in a
very dependent state with regard to the Powers of Europe.  This want of
independence was still further increased by the agreements between Turkey and
the various European States, known as "the capitulations"; for these were held
to apply to Egypt as a part of the Turkish Empire.

     The capitulations, originally privileges necessary for the safety of
foreigners in the presence of a powerful and unscrupulous Government, had
become, as the balance of power changed, serious obstacles in the way of
administrative reform.  The exemption of foreigners from taxation, and the
necessity of the cooperation of the consuls in all actions of the police with
respect to foreigners, were formidable interferences with the natural rights
of an independent nation.  It is reasonable to suppose that, in spite of the
improvement in their financial situation, in spite of important reforms in the
methods of collecting the taxes, and the substitution of ordinary European
processes for the violence of unchecked despotism, intelligent Egyptians might
feel bitterly the dependence in which they were placed.

     The army, like the State, was suffering from outside interference; the
higher places were filled by Turks and Circassians; the economical efforts of
the Dual Control had driven many officers into enforced retirement.  At all
events, the military agitators put themselves forward, and were for the time
regarded as the leaders of a national party; but the movement rapidly
degenerated, and in the hands of ignorant soldiers became an anarchical attack
upon all that was best and most progressive in the country, and finally
assumed the form of an intolerent assault upon Christianity in favor of
Mahometanism.  Early in the year 1881, and again in July, a spirit of
insubordination showed itself among the superior officers of the Egyptian
army.  Various changes in the Ministry were made with a view of satisfying
them, but the discontent continued to smoulder until, in September, several
regiments broke out into open revolt under the leadership of Ahmed Arabi.
Arabi was one of the colonels that had been implicated in the earlier
disorders, and there seems little doubt that it was the belief that the
Khedive and his Ministers continued to cherish a determination to wreak their
vengeance on him which drove him and his followers to their violent courses.
Though he at first acted courageously enough, Tewfik's heart failed him at the
critical moment, when he found himself surrounded by armed mutineers.  He bent
to the storm, and dismissed his Minister, Riaz Pacha, from office.  With much
reluctance Cherif Pacha, the Minister demanded by the insurgents, accepted the
vacant place, charging himself with the duty of establishing a constitution
and at the same time increasing the army from twelve thousand to eighteen
thousand.  He insisted, on the other side, upon the withdrawal of the military
chiefs from Cairo, and declared his intention of maintaining all international
engagements, including the Dual Control.  The conditions were fulfilled.  The
Chamber of Delegates was summoned in December, and Arabi and his confederates
withdrew for a while from Cairo.  Probably Cherif had looked for the support
of the Chamber is assisting him to establish a really national movement.  But
the assembled delegates not unreasonably regarded as useless a constitution
that deprived them of all financial power.  They demanded for themselves the
right of drawing up the budget.  The political agents of the two predominant
European Powers considered this a fatal attack upon the Dual Control, to the
maintenance of which Cherif was pledged.  An ill-judged note, communicated by
France and England, raised in the mind of the Egyptians the idea that active
interference was contemplated; its effect was the consolidation of the
national party and the determination of the delegates to cling to what they
regarded as their financial rights.  It was in vain that Cherif admitted Arabi
himself to his Ministry as Under-Secretary of War; the opposition was too
strong for him, and, honorably desirous to maintain the pledge he had given to
the Powers, Cherif found it necessary to resign.  A ministry in which Arabi
held the post of Minister of War was called to office under Mahmud Sami, a man
who shared Arabi's views. The army and the extreme nationalists thus secured a
complete triumph.

     But the movement had now entered upon a downward course; for there are
abundant signs that Arabi was acting with support from Constantinople, while
one of the first objects of the real national party had been the exclusion of
Turkish influence from Egypt.  Nor were proofs wanting of the disastrous
results of the military triumph.  Anarchy began to spread throughout the
country, and the situation of the European and Christian populations became in
the last degree precarious.

     Such was the state of affairs which the English Government was called
upon to face.  Its policy with respect to Egypt was of course subjected to its
general foreign policy.  Its chief objects at this time were the maintenance
of the European concert, which was regarded as the best machinery for the
settlement of international complications, and within this, and of the first
importance, the maintenance of friendship with France.  As far, therefore, as
Egypt was concerned, it was felt undesirable to act in any way except as the
agent of the European Powers, or to thwart the wishes of France if it could
possibly be avoided.  The joint control, the outcome of a compromise between
the interests of France and England, had therefore to be carefully maintained;
and during the first months of the new Ministry the two countries had worked
hand-in-hand with considerable success.  The Arabist movement now threatened
to disturb this amicable arrangement.  An agitation that could assume with so
much plausibility the title of a nationalist movement could not but appeal to
the sympathies of the English Liberals; while the French, who were credited
(and probably correctly) with less interest in the well-being of Egypt than in
the advantage of French bondholders, were eager for the suppression of a
disturbance that threatened financial prosperity.  Though the agents of both
Powers on the spot seemed to hope that the quarrel between the Chamber of
Delegates and Cherif might be regarded as a purely constitutional struggle,
calling for no outside interference, Gambetta, who had lately taken up the
reins of office in France, made up his mind that the action of the Chamber was
leading to ruin, and that strong measures were necessary to check it.  He
urged upon the English Ministry the presentation of a joint note, assuring the
Khedive that he might "trust to the united efforts" of England and France "to
withstand the causes of the external or internal complications threatening the
existing regime in Egypt." Such a note was not in accordance with the avowed
policy of England.  In issuing it the Ministry went beyond their mandate from
Europe; they took a step that might easily cause difficulties with other
Powers, and that was contrary to the prevalent feeling in favor of assuming as
little responsibility as possible in the direct government of Egypt. After
some hesitation, however, the Government yielded to their fear of breaking
with France, and the joint note drawn by Gambetta was sent to the Khedive,
with the disastrous results already mentioned.

     It also gave an opportunity to the Sultan to protest against the
unauthorized action of the two Powers in a matter which properly belonged to
him as sovereign.  The protest was disregarded by Gambetta; but it was not,
apparently, without its effect on Lord Granville, for in January he wrote to
Lord Lyons that he wished to maintain the rights of sovereign and vassal as
between the Sultan and the Khedive, and that, if armed intervention were
necessary, Turkish intervention, under close restrictions, would be the most
desirable form.  The idea of restoring order by the inter-position of Turkey
was, however, quite contrary to the views of France; affairs in Tunis had
lately strained almost to extremity its good relations with the Porte.  The
sudden fall of Gambetta's Ministry (January 27, 1882) somewhat altered the
position; the desire for active intervention disappeared, and the dread of
Turkish intervention became even stronger.  A rift had obviously opened
between the policy of England and that a France.

     Meanwhile events in Egypt were hastening onward.  A serious incident
occurred in May, 1882, leading to a breach between the Khedive and his
Ministers.  A large number of officers had been rewarded for their
revolutionary services by promotion, but many Circassians had been omitted
from the list of the favored.  They were now accused of having formed a
conspiracy to put Arabi to death.  About fifty were apprehended.  They were
tried in secret, and undefended, and the greater part of them were exiled for
life.  It is said that this was but the beginning of a general proscription,
and that three hundred other names had been added to the list of victims. The
Khedive commuted the sentences of the Circassian officers, and there can be
little question as to the rightfulness of this course.  But there was a fatal
error in the manner in which the Khedive acted; he had been too evidently
under the influence of the English political agent, who had even insisted on
being present when the pardons were signed.  This obvious interference of the
foreigners produced a complete breach between the Khedive and his Ministers.
On May 25th, immediately after this violent quarrel, emboldened by the arrival
of ironclads in Alexandria, the French and English agents, declaring that they
acted in the name of their respective Governments, presented the so-called
ultimatum, demanding the exile of Arabi, with two of his officers, and the
resignation of the Ministry.  The Khedive received the ultimatum without the
knowledge of his Ministers.  In thus acting he had no doubt infringed the
constitution.  His Ministry, already estranged, seized the opportunity, and at
once resigned (May 26th).  Great was the excitement caused by this step.  From
the army, from the Ulemas, and from the people petitions streamed in on the
Khedive demanding the restoration of the fallen national Ministry.  The
demand, backed as it was by the army with an open threat of extreme violence,
was irresistible.  Arabi and his friends returned in triumph (May 27th), and
were absolute masters of the situation.  The threat was no idle one, for on
May 30th, Mr. Cookson, the English Consul-General, had written to Lord
Granville, "Alexandria is in continued danger of being stormed by the
soldiery." On June 11th the danger became a reality.  There was a popular
outbreak, in which Mr. Cookson was severely wounded, and more than two hundred
Europeans were killed.  It became necessary to take measures for the
restoration of order.

     Already (May 21st), in view of the possible danger to the lives of the
Europeans, French and English ironclads had been despatched to Alexandria.
While agreeing in this step, the French Ministry had made it a condition that
the Porte should abstain from interference, but they had so far come into the
views of England that they had waived their objection to a European
conference.  The invitations were actually issued on June 1st, but not before
Sir Edward Malet had tried the effect of an appeal to Turkey.  He requested
the Sultan to use his authority as suzerain for the restoration of order.
Nothing, except a European conference, could be more distasteful to the Porte,
which had hoped to increase its influence in Egypt by covert support of Arabi.
To stop this action seemed suicidal; but to be obliged to do so by the
combined action of Europe would be worse.  In dread therefore of the
threatened conference, the Porte despatched a commissioner, Dervis Pacha, who
reached Egypt just before the Alexandrian massacre.  His presence produced no
good result.  He refused to take any responsibility, as he was without troops,
and instead of exerting his authority for the active suppression of
disturbance, he actually allowed the duty of restoring order after the
massacre to be placed in the hands of Arabi himself.  It was plain that, so
far from exerting any controlling influence, the Turkish suzerainty to which
Lord Granville had trusted was a mere empty name, without influence either
moral or physical.  Nothing seemed left but the use of forcible intervention,
ordered or allowed by the conference.

     The conference, which met at the end of June, began by passing a
self-denying protocol, in which the Powers pledged themselves to aim at no
separate advantage by their joint action.  Then, declaring that moral
influence had failed, it requested the Sultan to supply the necessary force.
He at once joined the conference, from which he had hitherto held aloof, and
accepted the proposal.  But the work of the conference was in fact nugatory;
events had been too quick for it.

     Arabi, who had collected his troops round Alexandria, had begun to erect
fortifications there which threatened the British fleet.  Again and again the
Khedive, Dervis Pacha, and Admiral Seymour had warned him to desist.  At
length the Admiral's patience was exhausted, and he proceeded (July 11th) to
carry out his threat of bombardment.  The other foreign ships, including those
of France, having already left the harbor, the work fell exclusively upon the
English.  Though Arabi's resistance was firmer than had been expected, the
bombardment was successful and the batteries were silenced. The English
sailors on landing found that the army had been withdrawn; but the Admiral,
without troops, had no means of following up his success.  Wild riot and
destruction raged for several days; the loss of life and property was
enormous.  Order was at length restored.  But, beyond the occupation of the
city, which as a matter of course had resulted from the bombardment, no
advantage appeared to have been gained; the army had not been defeated, it was
still mutinous, and had to be reckoned with.

     The policy of non-intervention, culminating in so violent an action as
the bombardment of Alexandria, had no lack of bitter and indignant critics. It
is in truth difficult to characterize as a policy action that appears to have
depended so much on the events of the moment.

     The first blow once struck, however, there was no hesitation.  A vote of
credit was obtained from Parliament (July 27th), a part of the reserves was
called out, and troops were despatched as speedily as possible, to what was
evidently the scene of an approaching war.  M. de Freycinet, the new French
Minister, also demanded a vote of credit.  But the opinion of France was
strong against interference, the vote of credit was not passed, and M. de
Freycinet resigned.  The French Assembly by this action declared plainly its
disinclination to take any further active share in the quarrel.  In the hands
of the English alone the campaign was carried out with unexpected success. The
military organization, as reformed by Mr. Cardwell and ably managed by Mr.
Childers, proved fairly efficient.  Sir Garnet Wolseley was able to conduct
his operations almost exactly in accordance with his carefully prearranged
plan.  With extreme secrecy, and after a feigned concentration in Abukir Bay,
he brought his troops through Port Said and the Suez Canal to Ismailia, where
he was joined by a contingent from India, bringing up his forces to about
forty thousand men.  Making the canal his base, he drew Arabi away from the
more fertile and highly populated parts of the country, and, after a series of
skirmishes with the object of securing the fresh water canal, finally defeated
him at Tel-el-Kebir, September 13, 1882.  The blow was decisive and final.
Troops were at once ordered in pursuit, Cairo was entered, and Arabi was taken
prisoner.  His army disbanded itself, and the soldiers wandered off to their
homes.  It had been a brilliant piece of work. In the words of Sir Garnet
Wolseley's despatch, "the army in twenty-five days had effected a debarkation
at Ismailia, had traversed the desert, had occupied the capital of Egypt, and
had fortunately defeated the enemy four times."

     It was no longer a work of destruction that was needed, but a work of
reconstitution.  The defeat of the army at Tel-el-Kebir and the capture of
Arabi had destroyed the only power capable for the moment of governing the
country.  The Khedive and his Ministry (the rightful respresentatives of the
Government) were left powerless.  It became a matter of urgent necessity that
in some way or other order should be restored, and the lost powers of
government replaced in the hands of their legitimate owners.  It became a
question whether England should undertake the work.  In their own interest
most of the European Powers desired that Egypt should be well governed, or at
any rate solvent.  They were willing enough that England, to whom, as they
recognized, peace in Egypt was a matter of vital importance, should be at the
expense and trouble of carrying out the work of reestablishment, which was,
properly speaking, the duty of all the Powers.  The destruction had been the
work of English arms; it seemed only fitting that the labor of reconstruction
should also fall to England.  Yet the position was anomalous.  It was by a
sort of chance that the English Government had found themselves involved in a
serious war.  They had drifted into an armed intervention, driven by the force
of circumstances and not by any will of their own.  They had not acted as one
of the members of the Dual Control in alliance with France.  They had not
acted as the mandatory of the general will of Europe.  They could no longer
declare themselves to be the agents of the European concert.  Their help had
not been asked for by the Khedive; on the contrary, the army crushed at
Tel-el-Kebir had called itself the Khedive's army.

     It was necessary to clear up this anomalous position.  One fact was plain
- Egypt was conquered.  The natural alternative seemed to lie between a
complete annexation of the conquered country and an open declaration of a
protectorate.  No Liberal government could contemplate such a step as
annexation, nor would the popular feeling have allowed it.  But the
establishment of a protectorate seemed both an effective and a possible
measure.  No opposition was to be expected of a formidable character, except
perhaps from France.  In Egypt itself the protectorate would have been warmly
welcomed; and there could be no question as to the impetus which the presence
of an English Resident, the representative of the protecting Power, would have
imparted to the realization of the contemplated reforms.  But the English
Government, wisely or unwisely, preferred a far more difficult policy, which
appeared to them more consistent with the views they had already declared.
They determined to occupy the position of adviser to the Egyptian Government,
which should itself carry out a national reform.  In a circular addressed to
the great Powers in January, 1883, Lord Granville thus explains the policy of
his Government: "Although," he says, "for the present a British force remains
in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquillity, her Majesty's Government
are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country and the
organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority
will admit.  In the mean time the position in which her Majesty's Government
are placed toward his Highness imposes upon them the duty of giving advice
with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall
be satisfactory and shall possess the elements of stability and progress."
Such an attitude has in it something of hollowness. The desire to educate the
Egyptians, to raise them till they are fit for self-government, and then to
leave them alone is admirable.  But advice, to be of value in such
circumstances, must be taken.  If it is not taken, it must be forced upon the
recipient.  And this became apparent when exactly a year later Lord Granville
wrote to Sir Evelyn Baring, the Consul-General: "It should be made clear to
the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of provinces that the responsibility
which for a time rests on England obliges her Majesty's Government to insist
on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be
necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course
should cease to hold their office."

     Whether the attitude thus assumed was wise or not, the practical work of
reconstitution was taken up in earnest.  Lord Dufferin was despatched in
November, 1882, to examine the whole situation, and to lay the groundwork of
the various necessary reforms.  He rapidly removed the obstacles from his way.
The Dual Control ceased at the request of the Egyptian Government, and in
spite of the opposition of France.  The trial of Arabi, which had been a cause
of warm dispute between the Egyptian Ministry and England, was brought to a
conclusion.  The secret and vindictive process by which his countrymen wished
to deal with him had been withstood by the English Ministry, who demanded for
him at least an open trial.  Lord Dufferin arranged a compromise. Arabi,
before a court-martial, pleaded guilty of rebellion and was sentenced to
death, a sentence immediately commuted by the Khedive into deportation to
Ceylon.  This act of grace was not performed without a Ministerial crisis;
Riaz Pacha and most of the Ministry resigned, but fortunately Cherif continued
to hold the Premiership.  With his patriotic cooperation the reforms quickly
began to assume shape.  A financial adviser, Sir Edgar Vincent, was appointed.
Steps were taken for the creation of a small Egyptian army under General
Evelyn Wood.  A native constabulary was raised under General Baker.  Mr.
Clifford Lloyd, who before long proved too energetic for his place, set to
work at the establishment of a police force, and the reform of the prisons and
hospitals.  Public works were placed under Captain Scott-Moncrieff, who busied
himself chiefly with improvements in irrigation; and over the judicial reforms
Sir Benson Maxwell was appointed with the title of Procureur-General of the
Native Tribunals.

     But all these promising reforms were suddenly checked for a time.  A
fearful epidemic of cholera swept over the country, finding thirty thousand
victims; and before the Government had recovered from the paralysis thus
caused, the appearance of the Mahdi in the Sudan compelled it to turn all its
attention in that direction.  It seems that here the real weakness of the
position which the English Government had chosen became apparent.  For while,
by the presence of English troops and the employment of English Ministers and
superintendents, the Government at home were obviously charging themselves
with the duty of re-establishing Egypt, they positively refused to accept any
responsibility with regard to events in the Sudan.  While conscious of the
inability of Egypt to hold its extended empire, they did not insist on such a
diminution of the area of the country and such a concentration of its forces
as seemed to be rendered necessary by its diminished power.  They allowed the
Egyptian army, under Hicks Pacha, to embark on the hopeless project of the
reconquest of the Sudan, only to meet with annihilation at the hands of the
Mahdi, November 5, 1883.  Then, when too late, the pressure of England being
at last brought to bear, the Egyptian Ministry under Cherif resigned, Nubar
Pacha succeeded to his place, and the evacuation of the Sudan was determined
on.

     It was an operation of the most extreme difficulty, especially as the
English Government clung to its determination of withholding armed assistance
from the Egyptians.  A man was found whose character and antecedents afforded
some hope of his ability to save the situation.  General Charles George Gordon
(popularly known as "Chinese Gordon"), who had previously ruled Upper Egypt
with success, proved willing to undertake the withdrawal of the scattered
garrisons whose existence was threatened by the advance of the Mahdi.
Trusting to his own unequalled power of influencing half-civilized races, he
undertook the duty without the assistance of English troops.  There was a
distinct understanding, as Lord Hartington declared (April 3d), that there was
to be "no expedition for the relief of Khartum or any garrison in the Sudan."
It was a task beyond his power.  All hope of a peaceful conclusion to his
mission speedily vanished.

     The insurrection spread and the Mahdi's troops captured the Egyptian
garrisons one after the other.  On the west Osman Digna, representing the
Mahdi, besieged the fortresses of Tokar and Sinkat, and advanced almost within
reach of Suakim.  The relief of Tokar was intrusted to Baker Pacha, with the
Egyptian Gendarmerie.  Not yet formed as soldiers, they were no match for the
Arabs.  The square, unexpectedly attacked on its march, was immediately
broken; the whole army fled, leaving two thousand two hundred on the field
(February 5th).  Sinkat and Tokar at once surrendered.  The fear lest the
insurrection should reach the coast and spread into Arabia, thus disastrously
affecting the Indian high-road, forced upon England the necessity of defending
Suakim.  Thither General Graham was despatched, and there he succeeded in
winning the Battle of El Teb over Osman Digna, and in checking the Arab
advance by subsequent operations.  The hand of England had been thus in some
degree forced; it had been found impossible to decline all responsibility,
impossible to avoid recourse to arms; and now the news that General Gordon was
surrounded in Khartum roused in England an overwhelming feeling that British
troops must be used in this direction also.

     As early as March 23, 1884, the Mahdi's troops had begun to fire upon the
city, and General Gordon, driven to the defensive, had been giving proof of
his resourceful vigor.  But before long Khartum was so closely invested that
no certain news of what happened there could be obtained.  A universal cry
arose in England for the relief of Gordon.  Yet the Government continued to
hesitate.  Though they were fully determined to send an army of relief, there
was a great division of opinion as to the most desirable route to be adopted;
months were wasted in discussing the question whether Khartum should be
approached by the Red Sea and Berber, or by the longer but better known route
up the Nile.  A vote of credit, nominally for preparations only, was demanded
before the close of the session, and seemed to prove that an expedition was in
contemplation.  But there were still some weeks of fatal delay; it was not
till September 1st that Lord Wolseley, who had been chosen to command the
expedition, sailed from England.  When once active operations had begun, there
was no lack of energy or good management.  The difficulties that of necessity
occurred in moving an army in small boats up a river broken with cataracts
were gradually surmounted, but it was not till December that Korti was
reached.  Aware of the necessity of haste, Wolseley from that point sent
forward General Herbert Stewart with a detachment of about two thousand men,
to avoid a great curve of the river by a direct march across the desert to
Metamneh.

     General Stewart, fighting successfully two sharp battles on the way, at
Abu-Klea and Gubat, arrived again at the river.  He had been mortally wounded
in the last engagement, and had given up the command to Sir Charles Wilson.
Several of Gordon's ironclad steamers were found at Metamneh, ready to receive
the relieving troops.  Wilson thought it necessary to make a reconnoissance
below Metamneh before proceeding farther.  The delay may have been necessary,
but it was certainly fatal to the success of the expedition. On January 28th
Wilson with a small detachment of troops steamed up to Khartum, only to find
the flag of the Mahdi waving over it, the place having been occupied and
General Gordon killed just two days before.

     General Gordon was cast in heroic mould.  His virtues, his faults, and
his eccentricities were alike full of grandeur.  His strange and varied
career, the mastery he displayed everywhere over the half-civilized races with
whom he had chiefly had to deal, the charm of his personality, the hold he
acquired on the love and fidelity of his followers, had given him a unique
place in the admiration of the nation.  The dramatic incidents attending the
tragic close of the life of such a man excited the deepest feeling throughout
the country.  From all sides the most bitter reproaches were directed against
the Ministers, who were held to have deserted him and by their procrastination
to have caused his ruin.  The fall of Khartum and the death of Gordon were in
fact the death-blow of the Ministry.

     Their whole conduct during the unfortunate year of 1884 was marked by
irresolution and weakness.  The anomalous position they had insisted on taking
up produced a tissue of blunders and misunderstandings.  Believing that the
evacuation of the Sudan was a financial and political necessity, they yet
declined responsibility in the matter, and allowed Hicks Pacha to march to his
ruin and Baker Pacha, unaided, to be annihilated in his efforts to relieve
Tokar.  They then suddenly made use of their practical authority to insist
upon the retirement from Upper Egypt.  But, regardless of the immense
difficulty of the operation, they sent no assistance to the Egyptian
Government, but trusted entirely to the individual efforts of Gordon.  Again
they blundered from a want of definition of their responsibilities and duties.
It was uncertain then, and is uncertain now, whether Gordon went out as
representative of the English or of the Egyptian Government.  It seems to have
been agreed that he was to receive orders from the English Government only.
And certainly the Government, through Lord Granville, had, on February 19th,
publicly declared their responsibility for everything that Gordon did. Yet
before he left Cairo he was suffered to accept from the Khedive the title of
Governor-General of the Sudan, and appears to have been instructed not only to
withdraw the garrisons, but to establish some form of independent government.
It is certain that he so understood his duties.  But every suggestion that he
made, every request that he proffered, for the purpose of carrying out what he
considered the object of his mission was refused and apparently regarded as
implying an excess of zeal on his part.  He was not allowed to use Zebehr, the
great slave-dealer, to counteract the influence of the Mahdi; he was not
allowed to obtain the assistance of Turkish troops or of the Indian troops at
Wady Halfa; he was not allowed to confer personally, as he desired, with the
Mahdi, or to open the road between Suakim and Berber; and, chief blunder of
all, a quarrel as to the route of the relieving army was suffered to waste
months of valuable time.

     The fall of Khartum sealed the fate of the Sudan.  The troops gradually
fell back.  A vigorous but not very successful attempt was made to reopen the
line between Suakim and Berber, with all the most complete apparatus, such as
a railway and vast pumps for supplying water to the troops.  The expedition
met with no disaster, but encountered opposition of unexpected strength; and
as the Indian troops employed were required elsewhere, the operation was given
up, the railway apparatus sent back to England, the withdrawal from the Sudan
concluded, and Wady Halfa made the extreme limit of the Egyptian frontier.
The chances of invasion from the Mahdi still remained so strong, however, that
an army of not fewer than fourteen thousand men was left in the country.

     In spite of all this terrible blundering - indeed, in some degree on
account of it - the condition of Egypt was extraordinarily improved before the
dissolution of Parliament and change of Ministry in 1885.  The Convention of
London (April, 1885) may be regarded as the starting-point of the successful
renovation of the country.  From the first it had been recognized that finance
lay at the bottom of the Egyptian question.  The law of liquidation of 1880
had certainly been a long step forward; but it had in it one point of
weakness, an error which has been common in many financial arrangements.  It
had insisted, not only on the payment of the interest of the debts, but on the
establishment of a sinking-fund.  Thus, when the resources set apart for the
payment of the debt and therefore payable to the caisse were larger than was
necessary, as they often were, to meet the interest of the debt, the surplus
was paid into the sinking-fund, however much it might be needed for the
general administrative expenses of the country.  The bondholders benefited,
but the Administration was starved.  Sir Edgar Vincent had shown much ability,
tact, and determination in bringing the finances into order and insisting on
the practice of economy.  But though by means of the sinking-fund the body of
the debt had been diminished by a million, there was still an unpayable
deficit on the administrative budget. Immediate improvement in the financial
situation had been rendered hopeless by the insurrection, the claims arising
from the riots in Alexandria, and the difficulties in the Sudan.  It was so
plain that the deficit could only be extinguished by some change in the law of
liquidation (which could not be modified without the consent of the great
Powers) that Lord Granville assembled a conference in London to attempt a
solution of the difficulty.

     The conference was rendered futile by the unwillingness of France to
allow any diminution of the interest paid to bondholders.  But it had not been
wholly useless.  Plans had been suggested which might be used as a basis of
future negotiations.  Meanwhile, as the conference had settled nothing, Lord
Northbrook was sent to Egypt as High Commissioner to see whether anything
could be done on the spot.  He advised the Egyptian Government to take a
strong step, and to order the taxes to be paid direct into the exchequer
instead of into the caisse, an evident violation of the existing regulations.
Indeed, acting in behalf of their Governments, the Consuls-General of all the
great Powers, with the exception of Italy, protested in no measured terms
against the action of the Egyptian Government. The caisse went further, and
obtained a legal judgment against it.  But meanwhile the broken negotiations
had been resumed.  The impossibility that Egypt should under the existing
arrangements continue its course of improvement was demonstrated, and, with
much expenditure of diplomacy and much timely concession, the English
Government at length succeeded in securing a general consensus among the
Powers, which was thrown into the form of the Convention of London.  By this
arrangement Egypt was allowed to raise upon the joint guarantee of all the
Powers a loan of nine million pounds, at a low rate of interest; while for the
future the surplus of the funds of the caisse, after paying the interest of
the loans, was to be employed first in defraying any deficit in the
administrative budget caused by duly authorized expenditure.  If there was
still a surplus, one-half went to the caisse, the other half the
Administration was free to spend.  The convention gave the required relief.
The loan was raised without the slightest difficulty.  It enabled the Egyptian
Government to pay the Alexandria compensations and all the outstanding
deficits, and left in hand one million pounds to be spent on the most pressing
need, the restoration of the system of irrigation.

     With limits restricted to territory which it was within its power to
defend, with finances which, now that the convention had secured a
breathing-time, were sufficient for its needs, Egypt was henceforward to
advance rapidly toward prosperity under the masterly leading of Major Evelyn
Baring, subsequently Lord Cromer.  The period of vacillation seemed to have
reached its conclusion.  Some of the magnificent hopes which had been formed
in the earlier days of the occupation were laid aside, and a firm hand
directed to complete a sufficient, if more restricted, programme of reform.

     The foreign policy of the Government had thus been attended with a fair
measure of success in Europe, and, in spite of grievous blunders and
disasters, had left Egypt in a more hopeful situation than that country had
ever yet attained.  It had produced peace; it had maintained and employed
successfully the European concert.  Even when breaking with it and acting upon
its own initiative, England had been allowed without any overt opposition to
follow its own course.